In this paper I argue that in order to secure the commitment of believers in reasonable comprehensive doctrines to political liberalism a third principle of justice needs to be adopted in the Original Position. Rawls acknowledges that neutral legislation by the liberal state may negatively affect some reasonable comprehensive doctrines, and I offer a third principle of justice to help alleviate this problem. This principle, which I believe is in keeping with the United States constitutional history especially where church-state relations (...) are concerned, maintains that a constitutional regime should, insofar as possible, avoid adopting rules with harmful effects upon those comprehensive doctrines which satisfy the conditions of reasonable pluralism. (shrink)

This paper explores some of the problems which arise from Immanuel Kant’s commitment to both human rights and the rights of states. Michael Doyle believed it was contradictory for Kant to defend both human rights and non-intervention by states in the affairs of other states, but I argue that for Kant there was no such contradiction, and I explore Kant’s claim that the state is “a moral personality.” I also discuss Kant’s belief that “Nature guarantees” that perpetual peace will obtain, (...) and I consider Kant as a teleologist. (shrink)

In The Law of Peoples John Rawls gives a list of eight principles for the law of peoples. I argue that the force of the principles depends in large part upon their being lexically ordered, and I attempt such an ordering. However, the lexically ordered list makes it clear that the duty of non-intervention obtains only after the duty to honor human rights is satisfied. Also, I point to certain “practical” difficulties with intervention on behalf of human rights. Rawls writes (...) that additional principles are needed, and I make two suggestions. I conclude that the problems arising from intervention and the need for additional principles show that the “second Original Position” is like the first Original Position: both involve, Rawls notwithstanding, the selection and ordering of principles of justice. (shrink)

The problem. The purpose of this paper is to provide a general discussion of Aristotle's views on scientific explanation, by which I mean a discussion of Aristotle's treatment of scientific explanation, its structure and its principles, as distinct from Aristotle's own principles of explanation. By means of this distinction I hope to be excused from a discussion of Aristotle on form and matter, potentiality and actuality, and the four causes, and to avoid so far as possible the controversy among commentators (...) concerning the respective merits of Aristotlequanaturalist and Aristotlequapre-Thomist Thomist. I wish to be excused from treating these problems in order to approach directly Aristotle's formal treatment of scientific explanation as given in thePosterior Analytics, but if I were to be accused of introducing a distinction between parts of the Aristotelian corpus for which there is insufficient warrant, if I were told that I am making an illegitimate abstraction from the whole of which thePosterior Analyticsis but a part, I should plead not guilty. (shrink)

Book Information Tower of Babel: the evidence against the new creationism. By Robert T. Pennock. Bradford/MIT Press. Cambridge MA. 1999. Pp. xviii + 429.

Part I includes pieces by Phillip Sloan on how Darwin theorized evolution, Jon Hodge on the Notebooks and the years Darwin spent in London after the voyage of the Beagle , and essays on Darwin’s views on heredity (Jim Endersby), on mind and the emotions (Robert Richards) and the argument structure of the Origin (Ken Waters). All of these are excellent and nuanced, and well referenced, written by leading specialists on each topic. Endersby’s essay in particular introduced me to material (...) I hadn’t previously encountered. (shrink)

After a discussion of Bacon's views on the subject, Van Leeuwen examines a different theory of certainty. This is the theory that was elaborated by Chillingworth and Tillotson, two English Protestant clergymen, in the course of a controversy centering upon the problem of deciding with certainty which beliefs constituted a Rule of Faith, i.e., the basic requirements of belief for Salvation. Chillingworth and Tillotson attempted to avoid both dogmatism and total skepticism by insisting on the existence of levels of certainty (...) and maintaining that the criteria of common sense are appropriate for the solution of theoretical religious questions. According to Van Leeuwen, the application of this theory is extended to scientific contexts in the work of Wilkins and Glanvill and is inherent in the scientific work of such members of the Royal Society as Boyle and Newton. The exposition is good; but the author's claim to a rigorous evolutionary line in the development of the doctrine of certainty among the figures he has treated is sometimes overstated.—T. J. C. (shrink)

Although philosophising about given languages had been going on ever since the time of Plato's Kratylos, the idea of an artificial philosophical language or system of signs began to take shape in the seventeenth century. Both Descartes and Mersenne explored the ground for the foundations of a system of expressions which could meet all the requirements of logical thought; but the merit of presenting the first elaborate plans goes to the British authors George Dalgarno and John Wilkins. 1 Leibniz (...) followed soon after with his characteristica universalis. (shrink)

Although philosophising about given languages had been going on ever since the time of Plato's Kratylos , the idea of an artificial philosophical language or system of signs began to take shape in the seventeenth century. Both Descartes and Mersenne explored the ground for the foundations of a system of expressions which could meet all the requirements of logical thought; but the merit of presenting the first elaborate plans goes to the British authors George Dalgarno and John Wilkins. 1 (...) Leibniz followed soon after with his characteristica universalis. (shrink)

John Wilkins and Malte Ebach respond to the dismissal of classification as something we need not concern ourselves with because it is, as Ernest Rutherford suggested, mere ‘‘stamp collecting.’’ They contend that classification is neither derivative of explanation or of hypothesis-making but is necessarily prior and prerequisite to it. Classification comes first and causal explanations are dependent upon it. As such it is an important (but neglected) area of philosophical study. Wilkins and Ebach reject Norwood Russell Hanson’s thesis (...) that classification relies on observation that is theory-laden and deny the need for aetiological assumptions and historical reconstruction to justify its arrangement. What they offer instead is a significant (albeit controversial) contribution to the philosophical literature on classification, a pre-theoretic natural classification based on the observation of patterns in data of ready-made phenomena. Their notion of ready-made phenomena rests on a conception of tacit knowledge or know-how. This is evident in their distinction between strong Theory-dependence and na ̈ıve theory-dependence. Their small t-theory-dependence permits patterns of observation that facilitate know-how but does not rely on a domain-specific explanatory theory of their aetiology. Wilkins and Ebach suggest classification differs from theory building in that it is passive (whereas theory building is active). Classification is possible just because it does not require the sieve of theory to capture classes that are ‘‘handed to you by your cognitive dispositions and the data that you observe’’ (p. 18). Finding regularities sans-theory is just something we do and can do without any prior theory about the underlying causes or origins of the resultant regularities. Luke Howard’s classification of clouds serves as an exemplar of a passive, theory-free classification system and the periodic table and the DSM help to illustrate this type of non-aetiological patterning. A recurrent theme is the nature of naturalness. For Wilkins and Ebach, the conception of naturalness is not one that is based on the generation or discovery of natural kind categories popular in both the traditional metaphysics of Mill and Wittgenstein as well as updated notions within philosophy of biology such as Boyd’s Homeostatic Property Cluster kinds. Instead, Wilkins and Ebach define the naturalness of classification as the falling into hierarchical patterns, aligning the search for natural arrangement with the aim of systematics, and as something that is grounded in a cognitive task or activity. However, they leave the question of realism v. antirealism open. ‘‘In natural classification...we must have real relations no matter how we might interpret ‘real’’’ (p. 70). There is tension with regard to their ontological commitments as they vacillate between constructive, operationalist, and realist approaches. Wilkins and Ebach initially define real as that which is causal and important (pp. 70–71), and later as that which ‘‘depends in no way upon a mind or observer’’ (p. 122). This makes their claim that there was ‘‘no real theory involved [in the pre-Darwinian classifications of Jussieu and Adanson]’’ (p. 64) difficult to interpret. Cont’d……. (shrink)